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Abstract. We provide the first description of and security model for
authenticated key exchange protocols with predicate-based authentica-
tion. In addition to the standard goal of session key security, our security
model also provides for credential privacy: a participating party learns
nothing more about the other party’s credentials than whether they sat-
isfy the given predicate. Our model also encompasses attribute-based key
exchange since it is a special case of predicate-based key exchange.
We demonstrate how to realize a secure predicate-based key exchange
protocol by combining any secure predicate-based signature scheme with
the basic Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, providing an efficient and
simple solution.
Keywords: predicate-based, attribute-based, key exchange, protocols,
security models, cryptography
1 Introduction
Two of the fundamental goals of key exchange are authentication and confiden-
tiality. Entity authentication inherently depends on some pre-established piece of
trusted information; the most common examples include a shared key, a shared
password, or a certified public key. Recently, cryptographers have developed ways
of providing more fine-grained access control in cryptographic operations.
Identity-based encryption allows a sender to encrypt a message for a recipient
based solely on the recipient’s identity (and public parameters for the system); in
other words, without requiring a recipient-dependent public key. The identities
used in identity-based cryptography may be simple usernames, but they could
contain more structured information as well, for example by appending an expiry
date or security level. The utility of this idea is limited by the fact that identities
must be encoded as strings, and a trusted key generation centre must generate
decryption keys for each resulting string.
In attribute-based encryption, a message can be encrypted so that it can
only be decrypted by keys whose attributes satisfy a certain policy. Attributes
are boolean variables, such as “student=false”, “CS department=false”, and
“Math department=true”, and policies are boolean functions. Decryption keys
are constructed based on the user’s attributes, and decryption only succeeds if
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the user’s attributes satisfy the policy encoded in the ciphertext.1 Research in
attribute-based cryptography has focused on encryption and signatures.
The subject of this paper, predicate-based cryptography, is a generalization of
identity- and attribute-based cryptography. Like attribute-based cryptography,
it allows for fine-grained access control based on whether the given credentials
satisfy a certain policy. However, credentials and access policies can be more
general than in the attribute-based case. Credentials can consist of name-value
pairs, where the values can be from arbitrary sets, not just boolean values.
Access policies are expressed as predicates over the set of credentials, and can
for example involve equality, comparison, subset, AND, and OR gates. Existing
work in predicate-based cryptography has focused on encryption, particularly
on expanding the expressiveness of predicates.
Our goal in this work is to consider the use of predicate-based cryptography in
a multi-user interactive network setting, specifically examining the cryptographic
task of predicate-based authenticated key exchange.
1.1 Contributions
Predicate-based key exchange security model. We give the first security model for
authenticated key exchange using predicate-based authentication. Our security
model has two security experiments:
1. Session key security : The session key should be indistinguishable to an adver-
sary. Unlike attribute-based encryption, attribute-based group key exchange,
and predicate-based encryption, the session key should be secret even from
other parties satisfying the same predicates as either of the two original
parties in the key exchange.
2. Credential privacy : In a key exchange, it should not be possible for anyone
– including the legitimate peer – to learn anything more about a user’s
credentials other than whether they satisfy the chosen predicate. We argue
that this is an essential property for predicate-based key exchange: without
it, we might as well return to identity- or public-key-based key exchange
with certified lists of credentials.
When restricted to the special case of attribute-based credentials, our security
model for predicate-based key exchange also serves as the first full security model
for attribute-based key exchange.
A generic predicate-based key exchange protocol. We present a protocol for
predicate-based key exchange that satisfies the two security properties above, ses-
sion key security and attribute privacy. The protocol is a signed-Diffie-Hellman
construction that can be used with any secure predicate-based signature scheme.
1 We have described ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption, in which keys have
attributes and ciphertexts have policies. These can be switched to obtain key-policy
attribute-based encryption.
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Although our definition of predicate-based signature scheme is new, attribute-
based signature schemes are a special case of predicate-based signatures, so
attribute-based signatures can be employed in our protocol construction.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We begin in Sect. 2
with a motivating example. We review existing work in Sect. 3 and introduce
notation in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5, we present our security model for predicate-based
key exchange protocols – including session key security and attribute privacy
– and comment on implementation issues. We define predicate-based signature
schemes in Sect. 6, and show in Sect. 7 how to build a secure predicate-based
key exchange protocol using predicate-based signatures and a Diffie-Hellman
construction. We conclude in Sect. 8.
2 Motivation
When one party wishes to establish a shared secret key with another party, it
may not be as simple as Alice saying that she wants to talk to Bob. Alice may
in fact wish to talk a customer service supervisor in the international trading
group of the Bank of Bob. In other words, Alice has an policy against which she
checks the credentials of the other party. Predicate-based cryptography allows
parties to specify fine-grained access control policies and has been used in the
context of encryption. It is natural to consider the problem in the context of key
exchange, which allow two parties to authentically establish a secure channel.
We begin with a motivating example, drawn from the health care industry.
Imagine a patient who wishes to communicate with a psychologist about a men-
tal illness issue. What are some security goals for each party? The goals of the
patient are to ensure that she is communicating with a qualified registered psy-
chologist, to use a confidential channel so that no one can eavesdrop, and to
maintain her anonymity so her disclosures about her mental illness cannot be
used prejudicially against her in another context. The goals of the psychologist
are to verify that the patient has valid insurance coverage from an insurer and
to ensure that no one else can eavesdrop on the conversation so as to maintain
patient-doctor confidentiality.
There are four types of security goals seen in the example above. The first
goal is policy-based authentication, where one party can be confident the other
party’s credentials satisfy some security policy, and moreover that multiple par-
ties cannot collude to combine their credentials to satisfy a policy that none of
them individually satisfies. The second goal is confidentiality, where the parties
are ensured that no one except the other authenticated party is able to read
their communications; this means only the party with whom we started commu-
nicating, not just any partner who satisfies the authentication policy, for we do
not want all patients to be able to read messages sent to one patient. The third
and fourth goals are interrelated: we seek anonymity, so an adversary cannot
distinguish between two parties who have credentials satisfying the same pol-
icy, and credential privacy, meaning that no information is leaked about which
precise combination of credentials were used to satisfy the policy.
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We aim to achieve these security goals using predicate-based key exchange.
The credentials held by a party can be expressed using name-value pairs assigned
by one or more credential authorities. For example, a patient with medical insur-
ance may have a private key with the credentials “Employer = Acme Widgets”,
“Coverage = Gold”, “Expires = 2011/06/30”, and “Insurer = Red Cross”.
The policy used by party to evaluate credentials will be expressed as a predi-
cate over credentials; the predicate may be composed of a variety of operations,
such as equality and subset tests, AND, OR, and threshold gates, and compar-
isons. A natural example of a predicate is a threshold access tree. Leaves of a
threshold access tree consist of boolean-valued functions such as equality tests
and comparisons. Interior nodes of a threshold access tree indicate how many of
the children nodes must be satisfied; for example, a node with threshold 1 having
4 children corresponds to an OR gate, while a node with threshold n having n
children corresponds to an AND gate. An example threshold access tree for the
case of a psychologist checking medical insurance is given in Fig. 1.
Threshold = 3 (AND)
Coverage = Gold Threshold = 1 (OR)
Insurer = Blue Cross Insurer = Red Cross
Expires ≥ 2010/07/05
Fig. 1. A threshold access tree for checking medical insurance coverage.
3 Related Work
Identity-, attribute-, and predicate-based encryption. Identity-based encryption,
in which individual parties need not have public keys but only identity strings,
was first proposed by Shamir [25] and has recently been the subject of much
research. It was extended by Sahai and Waters [23] to fuzzy identity-based en-
cryption in which parties must match at least a certain number – a threshold –
of attributes. An attribute, usually labeled by a string, is a boolean variable: it
is either present or absent. Goyal et al. [11] extended fuzzy identity-based en-
cryption to attribute-based encryption supporting boolean threshold access tree
predicates, which consist of boolean combinations of attributes using AND, OR,
and threshold gates.
Boneh and Waters [5] extended credentials from boolean variable attributes
to arbitrary values and supported encryption using predicates consisting of
equality conjunctions, comparison conjunctions, and subset conjunctions; the
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support of arbitrary, not just boolean, values is what distinguishes predicate-
based cryptography from attribute-based cryptography. Katz et al. [13] devel-
oped a technique for disjunctive predicates and inner products and Shen et al.
[26] introduced the notion of predicate privacy for symmetric encryption. The
improvement of predicate expressivity continues to be an active area of research.
Key exchange. The first protocol for identity-based key exchange was presented
by Gu¨nther in 1989 [12] but it was not until 2003 that the first formal secu-
rity model for identity-based key exchange protocols was proposed by Chen and
Kudla [8]; their model was an extension of the public key authenticated key
exchange security model of Blake-Wilson et al. [3] (itself based on the Bellare-
Rogaway model [2]). Kudla and Paterson [18] subsequently created a generic key
exchange security model to allow for modular security proofs which is also suit-
able for identity-based key exchange. A more refined security model for identity-
based key exchange was proposed by Chen, Cheng, and Smart [7]. A common
approach to designing secure key exchange protocols is using a signed-Diffie-
Hellman construction (for example, [6]).
Wang, Xu, and Ban [27] and Wang, Xu, and Fu [28, 29] have protocols for
what they call attribute-based key agreement protocols (in the random oracle
and standard models, respectively). The security proofs treat attributes as iden-
tification strings and then revert to the security model of Chen et al. [7] for
identity-based authenticated key exchange. These two papers provide no mech-
anism for evaluating policy predicates and do not consider attribute privacy at
all. As such, we consider these schemes to be merely identity-based. Ateniese et
al. [1] provide a protocol for secret handshakes – key exchange where participat-
ing parties do not learn either the credentials or the predicate of the other party
unless the protocol succeeds – using fuzzy attribute matching. Their protocol is
secure in the fuzzy selective ID model for encryption [23].
Gorantla et al. [10] present a protocol for attribute-based group key exchange,
which differs from our work in that all members of the group satisfying the
predicate can compute the session key. In contrast, we allow each user to specify
a predicate which the peer must satisfy, and these predicates need not be the
same; moreover, in our approach the session key can only be computed by the
two participants in the key-exchange protocol, not all parties that satisfy the
predicate; this is related to the notion of forward-security.
Signature schemes. Attribute-based signatures were first introduced by Maji et
al. [22], who provided a scheme that supported predicates containing threshold
access trees, with a proof in the generic group model. Additional schemes sup-
porting single threshold gates, in either the standard or random oracle models,
have been proposed by Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini [24] and Li et al. [20], and
a scheme with threshold access trees was given by Khader [16]. These schemes
all achieve the goal of attribute privacy, in which the attributes used to satisfy
a predicate are unknown the verifier. An attribute-based authentication scheme
was proposed by Khader et al. [17] with some additional properties beyond sig-
nature schemes such as traceability by an authorized entity.
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There are also a number of attribute-based group or ring signature schemes
that provide lesser privacy guarantees, namely that the signer is anonymous
among all signers possessing the same attributes [15, 14, 21].
4 Notation
We will use different typefaces to refer to variables, algorithms and oracles, and
constants. The notation a ← B(c) indicates that algorithm B is run on input
c and the output is assigned to a, and a
R← X denotes a value x being chosen
uniformly at random from the set X. We use the notation B(c)→ a and B(c) R→ a
when defining deterministic and probabilistic algorithms, respectively, with input
c and output a. We let λ ∈ Z+ denote a security parameter. We typically use A
to denote the adversary; AB(·) denotes A run with oracle access to B. Suppose
A is a finite set of size n and A ∈ A; IA denotes the binary indicator vector of
length n for the set A (assuming a canonical ordering). ⊥ denotes a null value.
We use G to denote a finite cyclic group, typically of order q and generated by
g. A function f is negligible if, for sufficiently large x, |f(x)| is smaller than the
inverse of any polynomial in x.
Credentials and predicates. Let C be a finite set; we will call C the set of creden-
tials. A predicate is a function Φ : C → {true, false}. We say that a credential
C ∈ C satisfies a predicate Φ if Φ(C) = true. Let P ⊆ {true, false}C denote a
set of predicates.
5 Predicate-Based Key Exchange
In this section, we define the functionality and security of a predicate-based key
exchange protocol.
Definition 1 (Predicate-based key exchange protocol). Let λ be a se-
curity parameter. A predicate-based key exchange protocol Π consists of the
following algorithms:
– Setup(1λ)
R→ (MPK,MSK): Returns public parameters MPK and a master
secret MSK. The public parameters must uniquely define the key space K,
the set C of credentials used in the system and a set P of predicates over C;
we implicitly assume MPK is an input to all subsequent algorithms.
– KeyGen(MSK,C ∈ C) R→ sk: The credential issuing authority generates a
secret key sk corresponding to the credentials C ∈ C
– Initiate(sk, role ∈ {init, resp}, Φ ∈ P) R→ state: The user initiates a new
session with the given role and predicate Φ.
– Action(sk,m, state)
R→ (m′, state, status, k): This is the core of the protocol:
it takes a secret key, an incoming message (or the empty string if no messages
have yet been exchanged) and the corresponding session state as input and
returns the next message in the the protocol, an updated session state, the
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status of the session (either Incomplete, Established, or Failed), and a
session key k ∈ K, which should be set to ⊥ until the session is Established.
We have defined predicate-based key exchange in terms of non-interactive al-
gorithms so that it is independent of any networking layer for message delivery.
In particular, we deliberately do not specify how the user determines what predi-
cates to use or to which session an incoming message belongs. For example, when
using TCP over the Internet, messages may be directed to an IP address (spec-
ifying the user) and a port number (specifying the session), but a key-exchange
protocol should be substrate-neutral: whether messages are delivered by car-
rier pigeon or pneumatic tube, the protocol actions are the same. In the case
of predicate-based key exchange, these implementation issues have important
implications for the security properties we desire, and any application making
use of predicate-based key exchange must take them into consideration. We will
discuss problems that arise from these networking details further in Sect. 5.3.
5.1 Correctness
A predicate-based key exchange is correct if, whenever two users who each satisfy
their peer’s predicate run the protocol over a benign network which faithfully
delivers their messages unaltered, both parties complete the session in state
Established and they agree on a key.
Let role(j) = R if j is even and role(j) = I if j is odd. Let Correct(MSK,CI ,
CR, ΦI , ΦR) be as follows: Set skI ← KeyGen(MSK,CI) and skR ← KeyGen(
MSK,CR). Let stateI ← Initiate(skI , init, ΦI), and stateR ← Initiate(skR, resp,
ΦR). Set (m1, stateI , statusI , k) ← Action(skI ,⊥, stateI). For j = 1, . . . , r − 1,
set (mj+1, staterole(j+1), statusrole(j+1), krole(j+1))← Action(skrole(j),mj ,
staterole(j)). If statusI = Established = statusR and kI = kR, then return
true, otherwise return false.
Definition 2 (Correctness). A predicate-based key-exchange protocol is said
to be correct if, for (MPK,MSK) ← Setup(1k), for all ΦI , ΦR ∈ P and for all
CI , CR ∈ C such that ΦR(CI) = true = ΦI(CR),
Pr(Correct(MSK,CI , CR, ΦI , ΦR) = true) = 1 .
5.2 Security Model
We require a predicate-based key exchange protocol to satisfy two security prop-
erties: session-key security and credential privacy. Our security model combines
aspects of the Bellare-Rogaway [2] model for key exchange, the Maji et al. model
for attribute-based signature schemes [22], and aspects of predicate-based en-
cryption from Boneh and Waters [5]. We define these properties using two secu-
rity experiments, each played by an adversary against a challenger.
In both security experiments, the challenger maintains a list of users U1, . . . ,
UN , which is not fixed, but is under the control of the adversary. Each user Uu
has credentials Cu and a secret key sku, and the challenger maintains a numbered
list of sessions, su,1, . . . , su,nu , with the following associated variables:
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– mu,`,1, . . . ,mu,`,i: The protocol messages exchanged in session su,`.
– stateu,`: The private session state information.
– statusu,` ∈ {Established, Incomplete,Failed}: The status of the session.
– ku,` ∈ K: The session key.
– Φu,` ∈ P: The predicate which the peer of the session must satisfy.
– Φ′u,` ∈ P: The predicate which the owner of the session must satisfy; in
our example construction, this value is sent to the peer as part of the first
protocol message, but it could in principle be specified by some other means.
– roleu,` ∈ {init, resp}: The role (initiator or responder) played by the user
Uu in session `.
We now present the queries available to the adversary in both games:
– Create(C ∈ C): The challenger increments N , the number of users, sets
CN ← C, computes skN ← KeyGen(MSK,CN ) and returns N .
– Activate(u, role, Φ ∈ P): The challenger increments nu, sets stateu,nu ←
Initiate(sku, role, Φ), and returns nu.
– Send(u, `,mu,`,i): The challenger sets (mu,`,i+1, stateu,`, statusu,`, ku,`) ←
Action(sku,mu,`, stateu,`) and returns (mu,`,i+1, statusu,`). If roleu,` = init
and i = 0, then mu,`,i must be ⊥.
– SKReveal(u, l): Returns ku,`.
– Corrupt(u): Returns sku.
Session Key Security. The definition of session key security is based on the
idea that an adversary should not be able to distinguish the session key of a
sufficiently uncompromised session from a random string, except with negligi-
ble probability. First, we adapt the Bellare-Rogaway definition of a matching
conversation [2] to our setting as follows.
Definition 3 (Matching session). A session su′,`′ is a matching session of a
session su,` if Φu,` = Φ
′
u′,`′ , Φ
′
u,` = Φu′,`′ , and any of the following rules hold.
– For protocols where r, the number of rounds, is odd:
• roleu,` = init, roleu′,`′ = resp, and (mu,`,1, . . . ,mu,`,r−1) =
(mu′,`′,1, . . . ,mu′,`′,r−1);
• roleu,` = resp, roleu′,`′ = init, and (mu,`,1, . . . ,mu,`,r) =
(mu′,`′,1, . . . ,mu′,`′,r).
– For protocols where r is even:
• roleu,` = init, roleu′,`′ = resp, and (mu,`,1, . . . ,mu,`,r) =
(mu′,`′,1, . . . ,mu′,`′,r);
• roleu,` = resp, roleu′,`′ = init, and (mu,`,1, . . . ,mu,`,r−1) =
(mu′,`′,1, . . . ,mu′,`′,r−1).
This captures the idea that the owner and the peer in the matching session
must satisfy each other’s predicates and agree on all of the messages exchanged,
except perhaps if the owner of the session su,` sent the final message. In this
case the owner of the session completes the protocol without knowing if the final
message was delivered, or if a different message was delivered instead, so we do
not require that the final messages are equal in this case. Note that the relation
“is a matching session of” is not symmetric!
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Definition 4 (Session key security). Let λ be a security parameter and let
A be a polynomial-time (in λ) probabilistic algorithm. A predicate-based key ex-
change protocol Π is session-key-secure if
AdvPB-SKΠ,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr(ExptPB-SKΠ,A (λ) = true)− 12
∣∣∣∣
is negligible, where ExptPB-SKΠ,A (λ) is the following algorithm:
1. Set (MPK,MSK)← Setup(1λ).
2. Let Test(u, `) be the following algorithm. Choose a bit b
R← {0, 1} at random.
If b = 0, then return ku,`, otherwise return k
R← K.
3. Set b′ ← A(MPK), where A has oracle access to Create, Activate, Send,
SKReveal, Corrupt, and Test. A is restricted as follows:
– A may make a single query to the Test oracle; let u, ` be the arguments
to that query.
– A must not have made any query of the form Corrupt(u′) for any u′ such
that Φu,`(Cu′) = true prior to the Test query.
– When the Test query is made, it must be that statusu,` = Established.
– A may not query SKReveal(u, `) or SKReveal(u′, `′) for any (u′, `′) such
that su′,`′ is a matching session of su,`, even after the Test query is made.
4. If b′ = b, then return true, otherwise return false.
Collusion resistance. This definition of session key security also implies collusion
resistance, since the adversary may perform Corrupt queries for multiple users
with credentials that collectively, but not individually, satisfy the predicate.
Credential Privacy. For the credential privacy experiment, the adversary
should not be able to distinguish between two users whose credentials satisfy
the same predicate, even if they have different credentials.
Definition 5 (Credential privacy). Let λ be a security parameter and let A be
a polynomial-time (in λ) probabilistic algorithm. A predicate-based key exchange
protocol Π is credential-private if
AdvPB-PrivΠ,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr(ExptPB-PrivΠ,A (λ) = true)− 12
∣∣∣∣
is negligible, where ExptPB-PrivΠ,A (λ) is the following algorithm:
1. Set (MPK,MSK)← Setup(1λ).
2. Let TestActivate(u0, u1, role, Φ ∈ P) be the following algorithm. Choose a bit
b
R← {0, 1} at random. Set state∗ ← Initiate(skub , role, Φ) and return ⊥.
3. Let Send∗(m∗i ) be the following algorithm. Set (m
∗
i+1, state
∗, status∗, k∗) ←
Action(skub ,m
∗
i , state
∗) and return m∗i+1.
4. Set b′ ← A(MPK), where A has oracle access to Create, Activate, Send,
Send∗, SKReveal, Corrupt, and TestActivate. A is restricted as follows:
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– A may make a single query to the TestActivate oracle.
– The predicate Φ′∗ which Cub has to satisfy (which is determined by the
Send∗(·) queries made by the adversary) must be chosen so that Φ′∗(Cu0)
= Φ′∗(Cu1). (If this were not the case then the adversary could trivially
distinguish Uu0 from Uu1 .)
5. If b′ = b, then return true, otherwise return false.
Credential privacy captures the notion of anonymity: the adversary cannot
distinguish between two users satisfying the same predicate. It also ensures that
the adversary cannot tell whether two sessions with the same predicate are owned
by the same user; we call this property unlinkability. To see why this holds,
suppose that an adversary executes a session with Uu0 , and the test session
with Uub using the same predicate. If the adversary could tell whether those two
sessions are owned by the same user, then it can discover the identity of Uub and
win the credential privacy experiment.
5.3 Implementation Issues
Credential privacy is an essential feature of any predicate-based key exchange
protocol. If an application does not need credential privacy, then standard public
key or identity-based systems may be used in combination with a credential-
issuing authority which simply issues a certificate on the users public key declar-
ing that they hold a given credential. This shows that there is simply no need
for predicate-based key exchange unless credential-privacy is desired.
Our definition of credential privacy ensures that the contents of the protocol
messages exchanged reveal no information about either party’s credentials, ex-
cept whether they satisfy their peer’s chosen predicate. Unlike predicate-based
encryption or signatures, predicate-based key exchange faces an additional chal-
lenge: users need to be identified by some means in order to deliver messages.
It seems unavoidable that this should leak some information about a user’s cre-
dentials, but we will discuss some approaches that may be fruitful.
Suppose that a predicate-based key exchange protocol is used on an IP net-
work, with each user having a fixed IP address. An adversary may initiate multi-
ple sessions with the same user using different predicates to exhaustively search
the credential space. A user initiating a session may mitigate this problem if
she is able to obtain a new IP address for each session, for example by using
tunnelling, or an anonymising service such as Tor [9]. Unfortunately, a user act-
ing as a responder cannot use this solution, since the initiator must know an
address to initiate a session. Depending on the application, it may be that only
the initiator needs credential privacy. In the example from Sect. 2, the patient
desires to remain anonymous when discussing their mental-health problems, but
it seems unlikely that the psychologist has the same requirement. However, a
society of secretive psychologists acting together could preserve some degree of
anonymity by operating a trusted proxy which knows their individual creden-
tials, and could choose a psychologist who satisfies a given predicate at random
from among the society.
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6 Predicate-Based Signature Schemes
Our definition of predicate-based signature schemes is a natural extension from
the definition of attribute-based signature schemes [22].
Definition 6 (Predicate-based signature scheme). Let λ be a security pa-
rameter. A predicate-based signature scheme S is a tuple consisting of the fol-
lowing polynomial-time (in λ) algorithms:
– Setup(1λ)
R→ (mpk,msk): The credential authority obtains a master private
key msk and public parameters mpk. The public parameters must uniquely
define the set C of credentials and a set P of predicates over C; we assume
mpk is an implicit input to all subsequent algorithms.
– KeyGen(msk,C ∈ C) R→ sk: The authority generates a signing key sk for
credentials C.
– Sign(sk,m,Φ ∈ P) R→ σ: The signer generates a signature σ for a message m
and predicate Φ, provided sk was generated with C such that Φ(C) = true.
– Verify(m,Φ ∈ P, σ) → {true, false}: The verifier checks if σ is a valid sig-
nature on m for predicate Φ.
Definition 7 (Correctness). A predicate-based signature scheme S is correct
if, for (mpk,msk) ← Setup(1λ), all messages m, all credentials C ∈ C, all
signing keys sk ← KeyGen(msk,C), and all predicates Φ ∈ P such that Φ(C) =
true, we have Pr (Verify (m,Φ,Sign (sk,m,Φ)) = true) = 1.
Definition 8 (Perfect privacy). A predicate-based signature scheme S is per-
fectly private if, for (mpk,msk) ← Setup(1λ), all messages m, all credentials
C1, C2 ∈ C, all signing keys sk1 ← KeyGen(msk,C1), sk2 ← KeyGen(msk,C2),
and all predicates Φ ∈ P such that Φ(C1) = Φ(C2) = true, the distributions
Sign(sk1,m, Φ) and Sign(sk2,m, Φ) are equal.
A perfectly private predicate-based signature scheme does not leak any in-
formation about which credentials or secret keys were used in signing.
Definition 9 (Unforgeability). Let λ be a security parameter and let A be a
polynomial-time (in λ) probabilistic algorithm. A perfectly private predicate-based
signature scheme S is unforgeable if
AdvPB-ForgeS,A (λ) := Pr
(
ExptPB-ForgeS,A (λ) = true
)
is negligible, where ExptPB-ForgeS,A (λ) is the following algorithm:
1. Set (mpk,msk)← Setup(1λ).
2. Let AltSign(msk,m,C ∈ C, Φ ∈ P) be an algorithm that, provided Φ(C) =
true, sets sk ← KeyGen(msk,C), and returns Sign(sk,m,Φ).
3. Set (m,Φ, σ)← AKeyGen(msk,·),AltSign(msk,·,·)(mpk).
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4. If Verify(m,Φ, σ) = true, B never queried AltSign(m, ·, Φ), and B never
queried KeyGen(C) for any C ∈ C such that Φ(C) = true, then return
true, otherwise return false.
The security experiment for unforgeability is slightly different than is typical
for signature schemes, because the signing oracle generates a new key for each
signature rather than using an existing key. However, for a predicate-based sig-
nature scheme with perfect privacy, the signature depends on the predicate used,
but not the specific credentials (or secret key), so the definition is appropriate.
An example instantiation. Attribute-based signature schemes are a special case
of predicate-based signature schemes. We can rewrite the notation of attribute-
based signature schemes in terms of the more expressive notation of predicate-
based schemes, as indicated in Fig. 2. Thus, all attribute-based schemes are
predicate-based schemes, but in general predicate-based schemes are more ex-
pressive than attribute-based schemes. It follows that existing secure attribute-
based schemes [22, 24, 17] are also secure predicate-based signature schemes.
Attribute-based [22] Predicate-based (Sect. 4)
Credential universe A, |A| = n C = {0, 1}|A|
Credentials A ⊆ A C ∈ C, C = IA
Predicate Υ : {0, 1}n → {true, false} Φ : C→ {true, false}
A satisfies Υ iff Υ (IA) = true C satisfies Φ iff Φ(C) = true
Fig. 2. Representation of attribute-based notation in predicate-based notation.
7 A Signed Diffie-Hellman Construction
We present a simple signed-Diffie-Hellman protocol using a secure predicate-
based signature scheme and a group in which the Decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) problem is hard.
Definition 10 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem [4]). Let (Gλ)λ∈N be a
family of multiplicatively written cyclic groups of prime order qλ, indexed by a
security parameter λ. Fix a security parameter λ; let g be a generator of Gλ and
let x, y, z
R← Zqλ . For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, we define
AdvDDHGλ,A(λ) = |Pr (A(g, gx, gy, gz) = 1)− Pr (A(g, gx, gy, gxy) = 1)| .
The DDH problem is hard if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A,
AdvDDHGλ,A(λ) is negligible.
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7.1 Protocol Definition
Let S = (SetupS ,KeyGenS ,Sign,Verify) be a predicate-based signature scheme.
We define the protocol ΠS,G as the following tuple of algorithms:
– Setup(1λ): Set (mpk,msk) ← SetupS(1λ); recall that mpk defines a set C
of credentials and a set P of predicates over C. Let G = Gλ be a finite
cyclic group of order q = qλ generated by g. Set MPK ← (mpk,G, g, q) and
MSK ← msk. Return (MPK,MSK).
– KeyGen(MSK,C ∈ C): Return KeyGenS(msk,C).
– Initiate(sk, init, ΦI): Return state← ΦI .
– Initiate(sk, resp, ΦR): Return state← ΦR.
– Action(sk,m, state): For clarity, we write the protocol action as four separate
algorithms which may be combined in the natural way. We also present the
protocol diagrammatically in Fig. 3.
• InitiatorAction1(sk,⊥, ΦI): Set x R← Zq and X ← gx. Set m′ ← (X,ΦI)
and state′ ← (ΦI , x). Return (m′, state′, Incomplete,⊥).
• ResponderAction1(sk, (X,ΦI), ΦR): If ΦI(CR) = false, then return
(⊥,⊥,Failed,⊥). Otherwise, set y R← Zq and Y ← gy. Set σR ←
Sign(sk, (resp, X, ΦI , Y, ΦR), ΦI). Set m
′ ← (Y, ΦR, σR) and state′ ←
(X,ΦI , Y, y, ΦR, σR). Return (m
′, state′, Incomplete,⊥).
• InitiatorAction2(sk, (Y, ΦR, σR), (ΦI , x)): If Verify((resp, X, ΦI , Y, ΦR), ΦI ,
σR) = false or ΦR(CI) = false, then return (⊥,⊥,Failed,⊥). Set
σI ← Sign(sk, (init, X, ΦI , Y, ΦR, σR), ΦR). Set k ← Y x. Return (σI ,⊥,
Established, k).
• ResponderAction2(sk, σI , (X,ΦI , Y, y, ΦR, σR)): If Verify((init, X, ΦI , Y,
ΦR, σR), ΦR, σI) 6= true, then return (⊥,⊥,Failed,⊥). Set k ← Xy.
Return (⊥,⊥,Established, k).
It is easy to see that the ΠS,G is correct when the signature scheme is correct.
7.2 Credential Privacy
Theorem 1. If S is a perfectly-credential-private signature scheme, then ΠS,G
is credential-private.
Proof (sketch). Consider the test session in the credential privacy experiment
for the predicate-based key exchange protocol. If ub does not satisfy the chosen
predicate Φ′∗, specified by the adversary – that is, if Φ′∗(Cub) = false – then the
session terminates with status Failed, by definition of the protocol. However,
the choice of Φ′∗ is restricted so that Φ′∗(Cu0) = Φ
′∗(Cu1), so in this case the
responses of the challenger are independent of the bit b. Similarly, if Φ′∗(Cub) =
true, the distribution of the signature returned to the adversary does not depend
on the bit b by the perfect privacy of S. Since the bit b is not used in answering
any other queries, we now see that the responses to the adversary’s queries are
all independent of b, so Pr(b′ = b) = 12 and Adv
PB-Priv
ΠS,G,A (λ) = 0. 
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ΠS,G – Protocol flow
Initiator Responder
secret key skI secret key skR
responder predicate ΦI initiator predicate ΦR
InitiatorAction1
x
R← Zq, X ← gx X,ΦI−−−−−−→ ResponderAction1
y
R← Zq, Y ← gy
σR ← Sign(skR, (resp, X,
InitiatorAction2
Y,ΦR,σR←−−−−−− ΦI , Y, ΦR), ΦI)
If ¬Verify((resp, X, ΦI , Y,
ΦR), ΦI , σR) then
status← Failed
Abort
σI ← Sign(skI , (init, X, ΦI , Y,
ΦR, σR), ΦR)
k ← Y x
status← Established σI−−−−−−→ ResponderAction2
If ¬Verify((init, X, ΦI , Y,
ΦR, σR), ΦR, σI) then
status← Failed
Abort
k ← Xy
status← Established
Fig. 3. Protocol flow of ΠS,G.
7.3 Session Key Security
Theorem 2. If S is an unforgeable signature scheme and the DDH problem is
hard in G, then ΠS,G is session-key secure.
Proof. Let A be an adversary against the session key security of ΠS,G and con-
sider the experiment ExptPB-SKΠS,G (λ). Let u
∗, `∗ be the test session. Define M to
be the event that a matching session su′,`′ of su∗,`∗ exists.
Case 1: No session matching su∗,`∗ exists (event ¬M). We construct an adver-
sary B against the unforgability of S as follows. B runs A(mpk) and simulates
the challenger’s responses according to the definition of the ExptPB-SKΠS,G,λ, with the
following modifications: whenever the challenger would compute Sign(sku,m, Φ)
(while responding to a Send query), B instead queries the AltSign oracle on input
(msk,m,Cu, Φ). Whenever A makes a Corrupt(u) query, B responds by querying
KeyGenS(Cu) and returning the result.
Now consider the test session su∗,`∗ . By the definition of ΠS,G, mu∗,`∗,1 =
(X,Φu∗,`∗) for some X ∈ G, mu∗,`∗,2 = (Y, Φ′u∗,`∗ , σR) for some Y ∈ G, and
mu∗,`∗,3 = σI . When A terminates, if roleu∗,`∗ = init, then B chooses m∗ ←
(resp, X, Φu∗,`∗ , Y, Φ
′
u∗,`∗) as the message to forge a signature on and returns
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(m∗, Φu∗,`∗ , σR) as the forgery. If roleu∗,`∗ = resp, B chooses m∗ ← (init, X,
Φ′u∗,`∗ , Y, Φu∗,`∗ , σR) and returns (m
∗, Φu∗,`∗ , σI) as the forgery.
We must now show that if the test session has no matching session, then B
satisfies the requirements of Definition 9, namely that Verify(m,Φ, σ) = true,
B never queried AltSign(msk,m, ·, Φ) and B never queried KeyGenS(C) for any
credential C such that Φ(C) = true.
Since the test session must be an Established session, it follows that Verify(
m,Φu∗,`∗ , σR) = true. Because of the constraints on A concerning the test ses-
sion, it follows that A never queried Corrupt(u) for any u satisfying Φu∗,`∗(Cu) =
true, which implies that B never queried KeyGenS(C) for any credential C such
that Φu∗,`∗(C) = true.
Finally, supposeAmade a query of the form Send(u′, `′,mu′,`′,i) which caused
B to query AltSign(m∗, C, Φu∗,`∗), where m∗ is the forged message defined above.
If roleu∗,`∗ = init, then m
∗ = (resp, X, Φu∗,`∗ , Y, Φ′u∗,`∗), and the only
circumstances where B could query AltSign(msk,m∗, C, Φu∗,`∗) are if Φu′,`′ =
Φ′u∗,`∗ , Φ
′
u′,`′ = Φu∗,`∗ , mu′,`′,1 = (X,Φ
′
u′,`′), and mu′,`′,2 = (Y, Φu′,`′ , σR): in
other words, when su′,`′ is a matching session of su∗,`∗ , contradicting our original
assumption. Conversely, if roleu∗,`∗ = resp, thenm
∗ = (init, X, Φ′u∗,`∗ , Y, Φu∗,`∗ ,
σR), and if B queried AltSign(m∗, C, Φu∗,`∗) then Φu′,`′ = Φ′u∗,`∗ , Φ′u′,`′ = Φu∗,`∗ ,
mu′,`′,1 = (X,Φu′,`′), mu′,`′,2 = (Y, Φ
′
u′,`′ , σR) and mu′,`′,3 = σI . Once again
this implies that su′,`′ is a matching session of su∗,`∗ contradicting our original
assumption.
Therefore B wins the forgery game whenever A selects a test session with no
matching session, so Pr(¬M) = AdvPB-ForgeS,B (λ), which is negligible.
Case 2: There is a session su′,`′ which matches su∗,`∗ (event M). Since su∗,`∗
is required to be Established, and su′,`′ matches su∗,`∗ by assumption, we see
that mu∗,`∗,1 = (X,Φu∗,`∗) = (X,Φ
′
u′,`′) = mu′,`′,1, mu∗,`∗,2 = (Y, Φu′,`′ , σR) =
(Y, Φ′u∗,`∗ , σR) = mu′,`′,2.
In particular, this shows that both X and Y were chosen by the challenger
in response to the corresponding Send queries. This allows us to construct a
DDH adversary C as follows. Let qActivate(λ) be an upper bound on the num-
ber of Activate queries that an adversary in the PB-SK experiment makes. The
adversary C takes a DDH tuple (g,X∗, Y ∗, Z∗) as input and chooses i, j R←
{1, . . . , qActivate(λ)}. It then generates a key pair (mpk,msk) ← KeyGenS(1λ)
and runs A(msk). C responds to all of A’s queries according to the rules of
ExptPB-SKΠS,G,A(λ), except that it inserts the Diffie-Hellman values X
∗ and Y ∗ into
the ith and jth sessions instead of generating a random group element. We re-
fer to these session as si and sj . If A queries SKReveal(si) or SKReveal(sj), C
aborts. When A queries Test(su∗,`∗), C aborts unless su∗,`∗ = si and su′,`′ = sj .
Assuming it does not abort, C sets k ← Z∗. When A terminates and returns a
guess b′, C returns b′ as its guess for the DDH problem.
Since the test session su∗,`∗ and its matching session su′,`′ are chosen by
the adversary A independently of the choice of i and j, Pr(C does not abort) ≥
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1
q2Activate
. Whenever it does not abort, C wins the DDH game if and only if A wins
the PB-SK experiment.
Combining results from Case 1 and Case 2, we see that
AdvPB-SKΠS,G,A(λ) = Pr(b
′ = b) = Pr(b′ = b|M) Pr(M) + Pr(b′ = b|¬M) Pr(¬M)
≤ 1
q2Activate(λ)
AdvDDHG,C (λ) Pr(M) + Pr(b
′ = b|¬M)AdvPB-ForgeS,B (λ)
≤ 1
q2Activate(λ)
AdvDDHG,C (λ) + Adv
PB-Forge
S,B (λ)
which is negligible as required. 
8 Conclusions
We have introduced the notion of predicate-based key exchange, given a secu-
rity model, and presented a secure protocol satisfying the security definitions.
Our security model for predicate-based key exchange can also be specialized to
attribute-based key exchange, a cryptographic task for which there was previ-
ously no rigourous security definition.
Our security model incorporates two notions of security: session key security
and credential privacy. We have argued that credential privacy is an essential
property of predicate-based key exchange; without it, we might as well use certifi-
cates to link public keys and a list of credentials. However, achieving credential
privacy requires careful consideration of the networking layer over which the
protocol runs, as the addressing information of messages – the packet headers –
may leak information. In practice, then, a secure deployment of predicate-based
key exchange may rely on an anonymising network such as Tor.
The protocol we have presented is a generic protocol that combines any secure
predicate-based signature scheme with a Diffie-Hellman construction, providing
efficiency and simplicity.
Future work. The major security models for public-key-based authenticated key
exchange have an additional query to allow revealing some of the session vari-
ables: either a SessionStateReveal query [6], which reveals the session state vari-
ables stored during the protocol, or an EphemeralKeyReveal query [19] which
reveals all randomness used during the run of a protocol. Adding either of
these queries to our security model would be a natural way to improve its se-
curity guarantees. Our generic protocol construction may still be secure with
a SessionStateReveal query, but cannot be secure with an EphemeralKeyReveal
query unless the underlying signature scheme is secure against revealing the
randomness used in signing. No existing schemes have been shown to have this
property, at least in the case of attribute-based or predicate-based signatures.
Our definition of credential privacy for predicate-based key exchange is com-
putational in nature, but our proof for the generic construction relies on the
perfect privacy of the underlying signature scheme, as defined by Maji et al.
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[22]. However, it seems plausible that a suitably defined computational notion
of credential privacy would suffice. It may also be possible to give alternative
constructions based on ciphertext-policy predicate-based encryption schemes,
though as yet only ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption schemes exist.
Finally, predicate-based key exchange could be extended to support multiple,
independent, mutually distrusting, potentially corrupt, credential authorities, as
in multiple attribute authorities for attribute-based signature schemes [22, §4].
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